Executive Managers in Peru\u27s Family Businesses by Shimizu Tatsuya
Executive Managers in Peru's Family Businesses
著者 Shimizu Tatsuya
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing








INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 







DISCUSSION PAPER No. 59 
 
Executive Managers in  









As in many other developing countries, family businesses are major players in the 
Peruvian economy.  Despite their growth into large-scale groups spanning a wide 
range of businesses, the owner families still have strong control over their ownership 
and management.  However, Peru’s liberal economic reforms in the 1990s brought 
intense competition into the national market.  Not only have these family businesses 
been forced to compete against large-scale foreign capital that entered the national 
market through the privatization of state enterprises, but also against cheap goods 
imported from foreign countries.  In order to compete, family businesses have had to 
move beyond the limited human resources available within the family.  The 
advancement within owner families of new generations with better education and 
training together with the promotion to top managerial positions of professional salaried 
managers from outside the family are some of the measures owner families are taking to 
overcome their human resource limitations. 
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One of the issues in the study of family businesses in developing countries is their 
survival after liberalization of a nation’s economy.  Because their management 
resources, such as human, financial and technological resources, are limited to those 
within the family, it is considered that in the medium and long term, family businesses 
will not be able to compete with non-family, joint stock companies.  However, many 
family businesses in developing countries survived after economic liberalization in the 
1980s and 1990s.  The studies on family businesses in Asia and Latin America by 
Hoshino and others concluded that family businesses are using various approaches to 
maintain their competitiveness, such as improving the managerial skills of family 
members through education and training, appointing professional salaried managers 
from outside the family, and institutionalizing the succession to leadership over 
management of family firms (Hoshino, 2004). 
In Peru traditional family businesses took advantage of the protected domestic 
market and established their dominance in many industrial sectors until the 1980s.  
However, when the government implemented economic reforms in the 1990s, such as 
privatization of state enterprises, deregulation of industries, liberalization of foreign 
exchange controls and foreign trade, family businesses were forced to change their 
management methods. 
According to Francisco Durand, who studies family businesses in Peru, there were 
many rises and falls among Peruvian family businesses after the liberalization of the 
economy (Durand, 2002, 2004).  He argued that while some family businesses 
expanded their size and scope and adapted to the new economic environment, others 
that stuck to the traditional management style of their owner families declined and 
disappeared.  Among 18 influential family business groups in the 1980s, three had 
disappeared and six decreased in size by 2002.  Only nine groups were able to 
maintain or expand their business.  Durand concluded that only those family business 
groups that broke with their old management styles and made alliance with foreign 
capital survived. 
Julio Cotler, a Peruvian sociologist, studied changes in owner managers running 
family business during Peru’s economic reforms.  He pointed out that the Fujimori 
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government implemented reforms in the 1990s while maintaining a distance from all 
business groups in the country.  These reforms freed companies from government 
regulations, and they were able to modernize their management by restructuring their 
business and introducing new financial instruments to raise capital.  Some family 
businesses decided to replace the traditional organization of their firms, in which family 
members served as directors and managers regardless of their merit, with young and 
educated professional salaried managers.  At the same time, these companies 
institutionalized a recruitment, training and promotion system based on merit (Cotler, 
1998, 13-16). 
The studies by Enrique Vásquez describe the development of major family 
businesses in Peru.  Although he focused on the historical aspect of the development of 
family businesses, he also followed the course of major industries in Peru in which 
family businesses operate.  He analyzed the strategies of each family and their rise and 
fall in the 1990s (Vásquez, 2000, 385-475). 
These studies concluded that as the liberalization of the economy progressed, 
family businesses in Peru changed in order to maintain their competitiveness.  
However, the studies mentioned above do not elucidate what specific changes family 
businesses have undertaken. 
A major issue for family businesses is access to human resources.  Traditionally 
family members have supplied the human resources for these firms.  However, the 
growth in size and scope of their business and liberalization of Peru’s economy since 
the 1990s have made the family too narrow a source for human resources.  The 
purpose of this study is to analyze how Peruvian family businesses have been trying to 
overcome the limitations on their human resources since economic liberalization.  The 
data used in the analysis is primarily corporate information that has been made public 
by the National Commission of Supervision on Companies and Securities (Comisión 
Nacional de Supervisora de Empresas y Valores: CONASEV), and annual reports 
provided by the respective companies.  The focus of analysis is on directors and top 
managers.  In Peru directors are often owner family members.  Many of them serve as 
directors in a number of companies and are not dedicated to the management of only 
one.  In order to see the changes in family business management, it is important to 
examine the top manager level that is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the 
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company. 
The first section of this study will describe family businesses in Peru and will also 
give an overview of the general management structures of Peruvian companies.  The 
second section will analyze how owner family members participate in the management 
of their businesses.  The third section will examine the training of younger generations 
of owner families and the utilization of non-family salaried managers.  The concluding 
section will discuss how today’s Peruvian family businesses are trying to overcome the 
limitation on human resources within the family in order to maintain their 
competitiveness. 
 
1. Governance of Peruvian Companies 
 
Family businesses studied 
In this study family business is defined as a group of companies whose ownership 
and management are controlled by a specific family or families.  Companies that are 
still controlled by their founders are included in this definition as long as their 
ownership and management are not only in the hands of the founder but also in those of 
the family as a whole.  Also included are family businesses that were founded by other 
people and later acquired by the current owner families. 
The family businesses analyzed in this study are the 15 corporate groups belonging 
to the 13 families listed in Table 1.  They are the principal family corporate groups in 
Peru listed in Shimizu 2004.1  Each family business owns one corporate group except 
for the Romero and Brescia families which control two separate corporate groups 
respectively.  To bring out more clearly the changes that have taken place in family 
businesses, a beer company that belonged to the Bentín family has been included in 
Tables 2 and 5 even though it was acquired by foreign capital in 2002. 
 
Corporate law and governance structure 
In order to understand the governance structure of Peruvian family businesses, I 
                                                 
1 Originally I had selected 16 family-owned corporate groups from among Peru’s top 30 corporate groups.  
But I eliminated three groups due to the unavailability of data, and two groups, Lindley and Raffo, were 
added because they went through structural reforms in the 1990s and are good examples for observing the 
changes that have taken place in family businesses. 
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will start with a discussion of the country’s corporate law.  Peru’s corporate law (Ley 
de Sociedades Generales), which was reformed in 1997, classifies corporations into 
closed or open joint-stock companies.  In the case of the latter, the law requires among 
other stipulations the establishment of a board of directors, the appointment of directors 
that represent minority shareholders, annual external audits, and registration of 
corporate and financial information with CONASEV.  In the case of a closed 
joint-stock company, the establishment of a board of directors and external audits are 
optional.  In both cases, the management of the company is to be delegated to the 
board and more than one manager.     
Specific seats on the board of directors and company managerial positions in Peru 
are listed in Chart 1.  On the board there are the president, vice-president, directors, 
and substitute and alternate directors.2  Managers are appointed by the board and 
include the general manager and managers responsible for areas such as finance, 
administration, sales, personnel, information systems and other areas.  Directors can 
hold positions as managers, and are called managing directors (director gerente).  In 
many family businesses which have not yet undergone generational change, the founder 
serves as director and general manager (director gerente general). 
The separation of functions between directors and managers differs from company 
to company.  The roles of managers are determined by the statute of each company, 
although the country’s corporate law lists some of the functions of the general manager.  
These are 1) signing contracts, 2) representing the corporate body, 3) attending board 
meetings with a voice but without a vote, 4) attending general assemblies of 
shareholders with a voice but without a vote, 5) issuing certifications of accounting 
documents, and 6) acting as the secretary at general assemblies and board meetings.  
However, it is difficult to grasp the importance of managers from this list of duties.  
Instead the recent discussion on the reform of corporate governance has helped to better 
understand the roles of managers. 
 
Corporate governance reform in Peru 
Reforming corporate governance in order to protect shareholders’ rights and 
                                                 
2 Substitute and alternate directors act as directors in the absence of regular directors.  In general a 
substitute director can substitute for a specific director while an alternate director can substitute for any 
absent director. 
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maintain the sound management of companies has become a topic of discussion all over 
the world. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
set down principles of corporate governance to develop capital markets (OECD, 2003).  
One of the issues of this discussion is the separation of ownership and management of 
listed companies, the aim being to separate the roles of the board of directors from those 
of the managers.  While the board, whose directors represent the interests of 
shareholders, makes important decision and supervises the management, the managers 
are in charge of running the company based on the policies decided by the board.   
In line with OECD principles, CONASEV announced its “Principles of good 
corporate governance for Peruvian companies.”3  Of about 200 companies listed on 
the Lima stock exchange, 19 have announced their compliance with the principles.  
Among them are four family businesses.  According to their annual reports, three of 
the companies hold monthly board meetings, two have appointed independent directors, 
two issue only common stock with voting rights,4 and one has installed an auditing 
committee on its board of directors. 
Despite of these reforms, the separation of ownership and management is not very 
clear.  For example, both Banco de Crédito del Perú and Pacífico Peruano Suiza have 
an executive committee in addition to the board of directors, though the members of the 
committee overlap with those of the board.  Another example is Compañía de Minas 
Buenaventura of the Benavides family.  In an effort to reform its corporate governance, 
the company installed within its board of directors auditing and reward committees 
composed of independent directors.  However, the president of the board is the head of 
the owner family, and the general manager is his son.  Therefore, it is difficult to see a 
clear separation of ownership and management.  These practices make it difficult for 
the managers to run the companies without the influence of the owner families. 
One of the few exceptions where there is clear separation of ownership and 
management is Banco Continental.  Among the nine directors of the board are the 
Brescia brothers who own 50% of the bank’s shares and hold the positions of president 
and vice president of the board.  They are the only family members on the board, and 
                                                 
3 CONASEV, “Principios de buen gobierno corporativo para las sociedades peruanas” 
(http://www.bvl.com.pe/gcorporativo/gobierno.htm). 
4 Many Peruvian companies issue preferred stock (offering better dividends without voting rights) and 
investment stock (offering the same dividend without voting rights). 
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none of the bank’s managers are from the family.  In addition, there is a steering 
committee (comité de dirección) consisting of a director-cum-general manager and nine 
managers who are not directors.  It is understood that while the owners (the Brescia 
family and representatives from BBVA) supervise the management, the steering 
committee is to consist of professional salaried managers who are in charge of the 
bank’s day-to-day management and operations.   
 
2. Owner Family Participation in Management 
 
This section focuses on the participation of owner families in the management of 
their family businesses.  In order to analyze this participation, the author prepared four 
tables to show the turnover in directors and managers of Peruvian family businesses.  
The first shows the changes in the directors of the principal family businesses between 
1987 and 2003 (Table 2).  The second and third tables show the number of family 
members holding positions as directors and managers (Table 3 and 4).  The fourth 
shows the educational and professional background of owner family members and the 
companies’ professional salaried managers (Table 5). 
Table 2 lists the directors of the principal family businesses in Peru in 1987 and 
2003.  In 1987 many directors were owner family members.  In the case of Cía 
Industrial Perú Pacífico, Palma de Espino, and José Lindley e Hijos, all the directors 
were family members.  In the other companies, one family owned the largest share and 
controlled the management, but other members also participated on the board of 
directors. 
When comparing the list of directors in 1987 and 2003, three points can be made.  
First, in some cases the same people were still serving as directors after 16 years.  For 
Banco de Crédito, Rímac-Internacional Comañía de Seguros y Reaseguros, Cía de 
Minas Buenaventura, and Inmobiliario Los Portales, the same people who were also the 
heads of the owner families were still serving as the president of the board.  Second, in 
several companies there was a transition to a new generation that took over management.  
For example, the presidency of Alicorp and Palma de Espino passed from the third to 
the fourth generation of the Romero family.  In the case of Buenaventura, the third 
generation made up the directors while the fourth provided the managers.  Third, there 
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were two opposite trends among family businesses: one was an increase in the presence 
of the owner family, and the other was a decrease in its presence.  Examples of the 
former were Rímac-Internacional Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros, INTURSA, and 
Los Portales; those of the latter were Alicorp, Backus & Johnston, and Corporación José 
R. Lindley.   
Table 3 shows how many members of owner families are directors and managers in 
their businesses.  According to this table, of 236 companies in 13 corporate groups of 
family businesses, owner family members serve as directors in three-quarters of the 
companies and as managers in one-quarter of them.  In the case of the Raffo, Wong, 
Cillóniz and Rodríguez Banda families, family members serve as managers in more 
than 40% of their companies.  In contrast, in the Romero (Credicorp group), Brescia 
(Banco Continental group), Graña & Montero and Galski families, no family members 
serve as managers. 
To examine the involvement of family members in management, 36 family 
businesses listed on the Lima stock exchange were selected for Table 4.  In the table 
the companies are classified into three categories: companies where family members 
serve both as directors and managers; companies where family members serve only as 
directors; and companies where family members serve neither as directors nor managers.  
According to the table, in one-third of the companies, family members serve both as 
directors and managers, and in more than half of the companies, family members serve 
only as directors.   
From the above observations, it can be concluded that although 15 years have 
passed since the start of Peru’s economic reforms, and the country’s business 
environment has changed significantly, the members of owner families still hold a large 
number of positions as directors and top managers in their businesses. 
 
3. Overcoming the Limitation on Human Resources 
 
The analysis of the previous section shows that owner families are still 
participating in the management of their businesses.  This leads to the question of how 
they are overcoming the limitation on capable human resources inside the family when 
the size and scope of their businesses have expanded.  Two key measures have been 
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employed to overcome this problem: the training of younger generations and the 
introduction of professional salaried managers into the businesses. 
 
Training of younger generations 
As shown in Table 3 and 4, owner family members do not make up the majority of 
managers in the family businesses.  However, there are situations in which they do 
serve as managers in the large family businesses. 
One of the situations is where they are the founders of the business.  The Wong 
family supermarket chain and the dairy company of the Rodríguez Banda family are 
such cases.  Although the current presidents of these companies are not the founders of 
their family businesses, it is their generation that has expanded their firms into some of 
the largest business groups in the country.  In the case of the Wong family, Erasmo 
Wong, the father of the current president, founded a small general store in a residential 
district of Lima.  However, it was his sons who expanded this small general store into 
one of Peru’s largest supermarket chains, E. Wong.  As for the Rodríguez Banda family, 
José Rodríguez Banda, the father of the current president, owned a freight transport 
company based in Arequipa city.  His sons acquired a Nestlé’s milk factory in the city 
and built it into Peru’s largest dairy company, Gloria.  In both cases, family members 
are currently occupying positions as company directors and managers. 
A second situation in which family members serve as managers is when they have 
extensive knowledge and experience in the industry, and the company is the core of the 
family business.  In these companies family members serve both as directors and 
managers.  Buenaventura of the Benavides family, Los Portales of the Raffo family 
and Alicorp of the Romero family are such examples. 
A third situation is when managerial posts are used to train the younger generations 
of the owner families.  From the information in Tables 2, 3 and 4, and from Table 5 
that summarizes the educational and professional experience of about 230 directors and 
managers, it can be seen that younger generations of owner families are holding 
positions as directors, substitute and alternate directors, general managers and regular 
managers.  Furthermore, these family members often have received education in 
foreign universities and MBA programs.  For example, at Alicorp belonging to the 
Romero family, all the directors in 2003 were of the family’s fourth generation.  Two 
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substitute directors from the family were also serving as managers, one in charge of 
finance, administration and information system, and the other heading sales.  These 
owner family managers held MBA and bachelor’s degrees from U.S. universities such 
as Stanford, Northwestern and Babson. 
At Buenaventura, the mining company of the Benavides family, two brothers of the 
fourth generation served in 2003 as the general manager and the manager in charge of 
business development.  Both of them studied in foreign universities and participated in 
an advanced management program at Harvard Business School. 
At Los Portales, the real estate development company of the Raffo family, 
members of the forth generation assumed the posts of director and alternate directors in 
2003.  One of them has a master’s degree in finance, and another who is also serving 
as general manager graduated from a U.S. university and later took an MBA at a 
Peruvian university.  
These are some examples of younger generations of owner families serving as 
directors and managers of their family businesses after receiving a good education in 
foreign universities.  This indicates that serving as managers and substitute/alternate 
directors is intended as training to improve the management skills of the younger 
generations of owner family members.  At the same time, it enables the next 
generations to grasp the detailed information and operations of their family businesses 
and maintain strong family control over their management. 
 
Bringing in salaried managers 
From Tables 3 and 4 we know that many professional salaried managers hold top 
management positions in today’s Peruvian family businesses.  In addition, Table 5 
shows that these salaried managers hold MBA degrees from graduate business schools 
in Peru such as ESAN, Universidad del Pacífico and Universidad de Piura, or obtained 
diplomas after studying management courses at these universities.  Table 5 shows that 
companies such as Pacífico Peruano Suiza, Alicorp, Backus & Johnston, Buenaventura, 
Gloria, Ferreyros, and Los Portales have managers with postgraduate education.  It can 
also be seen that there are a few salaried managers who have studied abroad, such as the 
assistant general manager of Banco Continental who studied at Instituto de Estudios 
Superiores de Adminsitración (IESA) in Venezuela, and two managers at Backus & 
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Johnston who hold MBAs from Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de 
Monterrey (ITESM) which has one of the best MBA programs in Mexico. 
Two types of managers can be found in the table.  One is managers who have 
been working for the same companies for many years.  For example, at Minsur and 
Ferreyros some managers have worked for over 20 years.  They reached their positions 
through internal promotion.  The other type is managers who have professional 
experience from other companies.  At Aceros Arequipa of the Cillóniz family, the 
manager in charge of planning and development worked for a state steel company, the 
marketing manager has experience in marketing and distribution from a beer company, 
and the information system manager worked for a foreign telecommunication company.  
At Los Portales of the Raffo family, a specialist with 25 years of experience in the hotel 
industry abroad assumed the position of manager in charge of its hotel business.  Textil 
San Cristobal, also belonging to the Raffo family, has managers who worked for Procter 
& Gamble and Arthur Andersen.  In the mining and insurance businesses, managers 
have received specialized education in their respective industries.5  These managers 
were brought in from the external labor market.  Their knowledge and experience in a 
specific industry helped them to obtain management positions in family businesses. 
 
External labor market and expansion of MBA education 
The human resource consulting firm Drake, Beam & Morin Peru has compiled data 
on the job market for corporate executives6 in Peru.  Based on the data about managers 
whom the company helped place into jobs in 2002, the average age of managers is 43 
years old with seven years of experience in their former jobs, and 47% of them hold 
MBA degrees.  Compared with the data for 1998 when the average age was 48 with 16 
years of experience and 34% holding MBAs, managers in recent years who have found 
jobs are younger, have less work experience, and more of them hold MBAs (El 
Comercio, 3 de agosto del 2003).  Seventy-five percent of the managers found jobs in 
industries different from what they had worked in before.  According to a business 
                                                 
5 Managers in mining studied at the School of Mines of Montana and the School of Mines of Colorado.  
Managers in insurance studied at the College of Insurance at St. John’s University, Centro Suiza de 
Formación de Aseguradores en Zurich (Swiss Center of Education for Insurers in Zurich) and the College 
of Insurance of New York.  . 
6 Corporate executives are categorized as high ranking managers (alto directivos) and executive 
candidates (candidatos ejecutivos).  
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executive survey in 2004 by the magazine Peru Business, the average period in a 
management post is about 4.7 years.  This is down from 8.3 years in 1996 (Peru 
Business, 2004). 
There are several reasons for the increased mobility of salaried managers.  
Attributing factors on the supply side have been the privatization of state enterprises in 
the 1990s and the expansion of MBA programs.  On the demand side have been the 
increased presence of foreign capital and the expansion of some family businesses into 
new business sectors.  
Regarding education for business managers, Peru Business wrote that there was a 
boom in MBA program from the second half of the 1990s. The MBA programs 
mentioned in Table 5 are those at ESAN (Escuela de Administración de Negocios para 
Graduados [School of Business Administration for Postgraduates]), Universidad del 
Pacífico and Universidad de Piura.  ESAN is a business school for postgraduates 
founded in 1963 to prepare business managers.  It was a joint effort by the Peruvian 
and U.S. governments and introduced a curriculum from Stanford University.  It is 
now a private university.  Universidad del Pacífico was founded in 1962 by Peruvian 
businesses with the collaboration of the Society of Jesus of the Catholic Church.  It is a 
small university focusing on economics and business education and is considered to be 
one of the best schools in the country.  The university started an MBA program and 
master’s program in finance in 1978.  Universidad de Piura was founded in 1969 by 
Opes Dei of the Catholic Church in the city of Piura in northern Peru.  It started an 
undergraduate business school in 1973, then a postgraduate business school at the 
beginning of the 1990s.  It also started a MBA course at its Lima campus.  Besides 
these universities with long histories of MBA education, other universities have recently 
started to offer MBA courses.  In 2000 Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, one of 
the highest ranked universities in the country, started a postgraduate business school 
called CENTRUM.  Other private universities are also offering full-time and part-time 
MBA programs.  In order to attract more students, some of them offer joint MBA 
degrees with famous European or U.S. business schools.  Peru Business reported in 
2003 that the average age of MBA students is 31 for full-time programs and 35 for 
part-time programs.  Their average professional experience is six years.  Fifty percent 
of them have engineering undergraduate degrees while 40% have economics or business 
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degrees.  The reason that many engineers are studying in MBA courses is that after 
working in the field as engineers, they aim to obtain higher administrative posts (Peru 
Business, 2003). 
Thus, we can conclude that while the demand for professional salaried managers 
has increased through the external market, the supply has increased through the 
expansion of MBA programs.  Today, professional salaried managers from outside the 
owner families have more chance to work for family businesses as top managers. 
 
Conclusion: Managers in Peru’s Family Businesses Today 
 
As the examination in this study indicates, family businesses in Peru by and large 
still do not show a clear separation between the ownership and management of their 
companies.  Directors are still from owner families, and many owners serve as top 
mangers.  This means that in most Peruvian family businesses, owner families still 
maintain strong control over the ownership and management of their businesses.  
Given this situation, the question is how they can overcome the limitation on human 
resources inside the family in order to maintain their competitiveness in a liberalized 
economy.  This study shows that part of the answer is in how owner families are 
preparing their younger generations and their introduction of professional salaried 
managers into their businesses. 
Owner families are pursuing good educations and better training for their younger 
generations.  Many members of the younger generations studied abroad, especially in 
the United States, and some obtained MBAs from well-known business schools.  
These younger owner family members work for their family businesses not only as 
directors but also as substitute/alternate directors and top managers.  This gives them 
training and experience in operating their family businesses as well as keeping control 
of them in family hands. 
The families are also bringing professional salaried managers into their businesses.  
Peru’s economic liberalization in the 1990s led to the privatization of state enterprises, 
the entry of foreign capital and the restructuring of private companies.  As a result, the 
liquidity of the external labor market increased.  Capable professional managers 
outside the owner families found more chance to enter the family-run businesses and be 
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promoted to top management posts in the companies.  This has given incentive to 
salaried managers to improve their management skills through studying in MBA 
programs and short management courses.  In response to the increased demand, higher 
educational institutions have expanded their MBA programs and business courses. 
We can conclude that family businesses in Peru today are trying to overcome the 
limitation on human resource within the family by giving better education and training 
experience to the younger generations and by utilizing professional salaried managers 
who likewise are improving their management skills through further education and 
experience.  These efforts are helping family owned businesses to maintain their 






Comisión Nacional de Supervisora de Empresas y Valores: CONASEV 
(http://www.conasev.gob.pe/). 
Cotler, Julio (1998). Los empresarios y las reformas económicas en el Perú. Documento 
de Trabajo No. 91. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. 
Durand, Francisco (2002). Backus y la desaparición de los apóstoles. Quehacer, No. 
138. 
Durand, Francisco (2004). Fuego y humo: Reconfiguración de la clase empresarial y 
cambios políticos en la globalización. Aportes al debate No 11. Lima: Fundación 
Friedrich Ebert. 
El Comercio(2003). “Los cambios en el Mercado de ejecutivos.” 3 de agosto del 2003. 
Fukao, Mitsuhiro and Morita Yasuko (1997). Kigyo governance kouzou no kokusai 
hikaku (International comparison of corporate governance structure). Tokyo: Nihon 
Keizai Shinbunsha. (In Japanese) 
Hoshino, Taeko (Ed) (2004). Family business no keiei to kakushin (Management and its 
evolution of family business). Chiba: IDE-JETRO. (In Japanese) 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (1999). Corporate 
Ownership Around the World. The Journal of Finance, Vol. LIV, No. 2. 
Malpica, Carlos (1974). Los dueños del Perú. Lima: Ediciones PEISA. 
Malpica, Carlos (1989). El poder económico en el Perú. 2a edición, Lima: Mosca Azul 
Editores. 
OECD (2003). White Paper on Corporate Governance in Latin America. Paris: OECD. 
Peru Business (2003) Proyecto MBA. Maro 2003. 
Peru Business (2004) Perfil del manager peruano: Excluxiva IX encuesta ejecutiva 
business. Octubre 2004. 
Peru Top Publications (2003). Peru: The Top 10,000 Companies. Lima: Peru Top 
Publications. 
Shimizu, Tatsuya (2004). Family business in Peru: Survival and expansion under the 
liberalization. Discussion Paper No. 7. Chiba: IDE-JETRO. 
Vásquez Huamán, Enrique (2000). Estrategias del poder: Grupos económicos en el 
Perú. Lima: Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico. 
16
Chart 1 Governance structure of listed companies in Peru 
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External auditors
(auditores externos) 
General manager (gerente general)(1)
 
Assistant general manager (gerente general adjunto) 
Administration and finance manager (gerente de adminisitración y 
finanzas) 
Sales manager (gerente de venta) 
Personnel manager (gerente de recursos humanos) 







Appoint Report Supervise 
(optional) executive committee that 
consists of directors and managers
(optional) auditing / reward 
committee that consists of directors
Note: (1) In case that a director is also a manager, it is called managing director 
(director gerente). 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Corporate Law（Ley General de Sociedades）



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 Changes of directors of principle family businesses in Peru (1987 and 2003)
Family Company (Activity) Psition 1987 2003
Romero Banco de Crédito del Perú P Romero (III) Romero (III)
(Banking) VP Non Romero Non romero
D 1 Romero 1 Romero
9 Non Romero 9 Non Romero
Cía Industrial Peru Pacífico (1987) P Romero (III) Romero (IV)
Alicorp (2003) VP Romero (III) Romero (IV)
(Food) D 2 Romero (III) 2 Romero (IV)
1 Non Romero 5 Non Romero
AD 3 Romero (IV)
Cía de seguros y reaseguros Peruano-Suiza (1987) P Non Romero Romero (III)
Pacífico Peruano Suiza (2003) VP Romero (III) Romero (III)
(Insurance) D 1 Romero (III) 2 Romero (IV)
7 Non Romero 9 Non Romero
Palma de Espino P Romero (III) Romero (IV)
(Agro-industry) VP Romero (III) Romero (IV)
D 1 Romero (III) 2 Romero (IV)
1 Non Romero 1 Non Romero
Brescia Compañía de Seguros Rímac (1987) P Bresica (II) Bresica (II)
Rímac-Internacional Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros VP Non Brescia Bresica (II)
(Insurance) D 1 Brescia (II) 1 Brescia (II)
9 Non Brescia 4 Brescia (III)
3 Non Bresica
Compañía Internacional de Seguros del Perú (1987) P Bresica (II)
(Insurance, merged with the above company) D 7 Non Brescia
Inversiones Nacionales de Turismo (INTURSA) P Non Brescia Bresica (II)
(Tourism) VP Bresica (II)
2 Brescia (II) 4 Bresica (III)
3 Non Brescia 1 Non Brescia
Bentín Cervecería Backus & Johnston (1987) P Bentín (II) Bentín (III)
Unión de Cervecerias Peruanas Backus y Johnston (2003)(1) VP Non Bentín Bentín (III)
(Beer) D 1 Bentín (III) 1 Bentín (IV)
8 Non Bentín 11 Non Bentín
GM Bentín (III) Bentín (IV)
Benavides Compañía de Minas Buenaventura P Benavides (III) Benavides (III)
(Mining) VP Benavides (III) Benavides (III)
5 Non Benavides 5 Non Benavides
GM Benavides (IV)
M Benavides (IV)
Ferreyros Enrique Ferreyros (1987) P Ferreyros (II) Ferreyros (III)
Ferreyros (2003) VP Ferreyros (III) Non Ferreyros
(Import of Capital Goods) 2 Ferreyros 1 Ferreyros
2 Feerreyros (II) 5 Non Ferreyros
6 Non Ferreyros
Rizo Patron Cementos Lima P Non Rizo Patron Rizo Patron (II)
(Cement) VP Non Rizo Patron Non Rizo Patron
1 Rizo Patron (III) 2 Rizo Patron (III)
8 Non Rizo Patron 8 Non Rizo Patron
Lindley José Lindley e Hijos (1987) P Lindley (II) Lindley (III)
Corporación José R. Lindley (2003) 1 Lindley (III) 2 Lindley (IV)
(Beverage) 2 Lindley (II) 4 Non Lindley
1 Lindley
AD 2 Non Lindley
Raffo Los Portales P Raffo (III) Raffo (III)
(Real estate) VP Non Raffo Non Raffo
7 non Raffo 1 Raffo (IV)
1 Raffo
AD 1 Raffo (IV)
1 Non Raffo
Note:
P: President; VP: Vice-president; D: Director; AD: Alternate Director; GM: General Manager; M: Manager
The same person in 1987 and 2003 is connected with a line.
(1) It was acquired by a Colombian company in 2002. It was included to show changes of directros by the acquisition.
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Malpica (1989) and annual reports of each company.
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fr
om
 B
ab
so
n.
6 
N
on
 R
om
er
o
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 fr
om
 th
e 
ow
ne
r f
am
ily
 th
at
 o
w
ne
d 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 w
hi
ch
A
lic
or
p 
ac
qu
ire
d 
in
 m
id
 1
99
0s
.  
O
th
er
s a
re
 fr
om
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t b
an
k.
7 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
G
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 is
 fo
rm
er
 v
ic
e-
m
in
is
te
r o
f c
om
m
er
ce
 a
nd
 g
ra
du
at
ed
 fr
om
C
at
ho
lic
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 in
 C
hi
le
 a
nd
 to
ok
 c
ou
rs
es
 a
t K
el
lo
gg
 sc
ho
ol
.  
O
th
er
tw
o 
m
an
ag
er
s t
oo
k 
m
as
te
r's
 d
eg
re
es
 in
 fo
re
ig
n 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s. 
 O
th
er
 fo
ur
m
an
ag
er
s f
in
is
he
d 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s i
n 
Pe
ru
, t
w
o 
of
 w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
M
B
A
.
4 
R
om
er
o
A
ll 
ar
e 
th
e 
fo
ur
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
ar
e 
di
re
ct
or
s o
f A
lic
or
p 
as
 w
el
l.
no
 B
re
sc
ia
1 
N
on
 R
om
er
o
Th
e 
fo
rm
er
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 o
f a
 g
ro
up
 c
om
pa
ny
 a
nd
 a
 c
ol
la
bo
ra
to
r o
f t
he
ow
ne
r f
am
ily
.
1 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
G
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 fi
ni
sh
ed
 P
er
uv
ia
n 
na
va
l a
ca
de
m
y 
an
d 
fin
is
he
d 
M
B
A
 a
nd
M
as
te
r's
 d
eg
re
e 
in
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
.
B
re
sc
ia
4 
B
re
sc
ia
Tw
o 
br
ot
he
rs
 o
f t
he
 se
co
nd
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ow
ne
r f
am
ily
 is
 p
re
si
de
nt
an
d 
vi
ce
-p
re
si
de
nt
.  
Tw
o 
fr
om
 th
e 
th
ird
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
ar
e 
di
re
ct
or
s  
(O
ne
 o
f
th
em
 is
 w
ith
 M
B
A
).
no
 B
re
sc
ia
5 
N
on
 B
re
sc
ia
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 fr
om
 B
B
V
A
, S
pa
ni
sh
 b
an
k 
th
at
 o
w
ns
 a
no
th
er
 5
0%
 o
f t
he
ba
nk
.  
O
ne
 o
f t
he
m
 is
 m
an
ag
in
g 
di
re
ct
or
.
10
 sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
St
ee
rin
g 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 （
C
om
té
 d
e 
D
ire
cc
ió
n）
 c
on
si
st
s o
f 1
0 
m
an
ag
er
s. 
 T
he
ch
ai
r i
s d
ire
ct
or
 a
nd
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 fr
om
 B
B
V
A
.  
O
ne
 o
f t
he
 a
ss
is
ta
nt
ge
ne
ra
l m
an
ag
er
s h
as
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 IE
SA
 a
nd
 w
as
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 in
 a
pe
ns
io
n 
fu
nd
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tin
g 
co
m
pa
ny
 (A
FP
) o
f t
he
 g
ro
up
.  
Th
e 
ot
he
r
as
si
st
an
t g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 is
 a
ls
o 
di
re
ct
or
 o
f t
he
 A
FP
.
6 
B
re
sc
ia
Tw
o 
br
ot
he
rs
 o
f t
he
 se
co
nd
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
ar
e 
pr
es
id
en
t a
nd
 v
ic
e-
pr
es
id
en
t.
To
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 a
no
th
er
 d
ire
ct
or
 o
f t
he
 se
co
nd
 g
en
er
at
io
n,
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
be
en
di
re
ct
or
s s
in
ce
 1
97
7.
  T
he
 th
ird
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
as
su
m
ed
 th
e 
po
st
 in
 2
00
2.
1 
B
re
sc
ia
O
ne
 o
f t
he
 th
ird
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
is
 d
ire
ct
or
 a
nd
 a
ss
is
ta
nt
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
.
5 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
G
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
w
or
ki
ng
 fo
r s
in
ce
 1
97
7.
  O
th
er
 tw
o 
m
an
ag
er
s
al
so
 h
av
e 
be
en
 w
or
ki
ng
 fo
r o
ve
r 2
0 
ye
ar
s.
C
re
di
co
rp
2)
(F
in
an
ce
)
Pa
cí
fic
o 
Pe
ru
an
o
Su
iz
a
 (I
ns
ur
an
ce
)
A
lic
or
p
 (F
oo
d)
R
an
sa
(L
og
is
tic
s)
B
an
co
C
on
tin
en
ta
l
 (B
an
ki
ng
)
M
in
su
r
(M
in
in
g)
D
ire
ct
or
s1
)
M
an
ag
er
s
22
O
w
ne
r f
am
ily
C
om
pa
ny
(I
nd
us
try
)
D
ire
ct
or
s1
)
M
an
ag
er
s
4 
B
re
sc
ia
Th
re
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
ar
e 
pr
es
id
en
t a
nd
 d
ire
ct
or
s. 
 O
ne
 fr
om
th
e 
th
ird
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
is
 d
ire
ct
or
.
no
 B
re
sc
ia
3 
N
on
 B
re
sc
ia
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 fr
om
 m
in
or
ity
 sh
ar
eh
ol
di
ng
 fa
m
ili
es
.
6 
N
on
 B
re
sc
ia
m
an
ag
er
s
A
 so
n 
of
 a
 m
in
or
ity
 sh
ar
eh
ol
di
ng
 d
ire
ct
or
 is
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
.  
H
e 
ha
s
m
as
te
r's
 d
eg
re
e 
in
 c
he
m
is
try
.  
A
m
on
g 
fiv
e 
sa
la
rie
d 
m
an
ag
er
s, 
3 
w
ho
st
ud
ie
d 
m
in
in
g 
an
d 
m
et
al
 e
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
w
or
ki
ng
 si
nc
e 
19
80
s.
Tw
o 
ot
he
rs
 w
ho
 st
ud
ie
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t h
av
e 
be
en
 w
or
ki
ng
 si
nc
e 
19
94
 a
nd
20
01
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
4 
B
en
tín
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s a
gr
on
om
is
t a
nd
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 tw
o 
di
re
ct
or
s i
s s
ur
ge
on
 w
ith
M
B
A
.
1 
B
en
tín
N
ep
he
w
 o
f p
re
si
de
nt
 is
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 w
ho
 h
as
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 IT
ES
M
.
10
 N
on
 B
en
tín
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 fr
om
 m
in
or
ity
 sh
ar
eh
ol
di
ng
 fa
m
ili
es
.
9 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
Si
x 
m
an
ag
er
s h
av
e 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 o
r i
ts
 g
ro
up
 c
om
pa
ny
 fo
r o
ve
r
20
 y
ea
rs
.  
Th
ey
 g
ra
du
at
ed
 fr
om
 u
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
 in
 P
er
u.
  T
ow
 h
av
e 
M
B
A
fr
om
 IT
ES
M
 a
nd
 5
 a
re
 w
ith
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 P
er
uv
ia
n 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s (
U
 P
iu
ra
,
ES
A
N
).
B
en
av
id
es
2 
B
en
av
id
es
Pr
es
id
en
t w
as
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 fr
om
 1
96
4 
to
 1
88
6.
2 
B
en
av
id
es
So
n 
of
 th
e 
pr
es
id
en
t w
ith
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 fo
re
ig
n 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 is
 g
en
er
al
m
an
ag
er
.  
Th
e 
ot
he
r m
an
ag
er
 a
ls
o 
ha
s m
as
te
r's
 d
eg
re
e 
fr
om
 a
 fo
re
ig
n
un
iv
er
si
ty
.  
B
ot
h 
of
 th
em
 to
ok
 m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ro
gr
am
 a
t H
ar
va
rd
 B
us
in
es
s
Sc
ho
ol
.
5 
N
on
 B
en
av
id
es
A
ll 
fiv
e 
ar
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t d
ire
ct
or
s. 
 E
x 
pa
rtn
er
 o
f A
rth
ur
 A
nd
er
se
n,
 e
x
vi
ce
-p
re
si
de
nt
 o
f f
or
ei
gn
 m
in
in
g 
co
m
pa
ny
, e
co
no
m
is
t, 
et
c.
  T
he
re
 a
re
aw
ar
d 
an
d 
au
di
tin
g 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s w
ith
in
 th
e 
bo
ar
d.
4 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
Fi
na
nc
e 
an
d 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
m
an
ag
er
 h
as
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 U
P 
w
ith
 st
ud
ie
s a
t
H
ar
va
rd
 B
us
in
es
s S
ch
oo
l. 
 H
e 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r n
at
io
na
l b
an
k 
fo
r m
in
in
g 
se
ct
or
.
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
 is
 g
ra
du
at
e 
fr
om
 P
U
C
P 
an
d 
st
ud
ie
d 
at
 U
 P
iu
ra
.
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
m
an
ag
er
 g
ra
du
at
ed
 fr
om
 C
ol
or
ad
o 
Sc
ho
ol
 o
f M
in
in
g 
an
d
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r g
ro
up
 m
in
es
.  
Ex
pl
or
at
io
n 
m
an
ag
er
 is
 g
eo
lo
gi
st
 w
ith
 P
h.
D
fr
om
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f L
iv
er
po
ol
.
R
od
ríq
ue
z 
B
an
da
3 
R
od
ríg
ue
z
B
an
da
Th
re
e 
br
ot
he
rs
 a
re
 p
re
si
de
nt
, v
ic
e-
pr
es
id
en
t a
nd
 d
ire
ct
or
.  
Th
ey
 a
re
 th
e
se
co
nd
 g
en
er
at
io
n,
 b
ut
 p
ra
ct
ic
al
ly
 a
re
 fo
un
de
rs
 w
ho
 e
xp
an
de
d 
fa
m
ily
bu
si
ne
ss
.  
Tw
o 
of
 th
em
 h
av
e 
ba
ch
el
or
's 
an
d 
m
as
te
r's
 d
eg
re
e 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y
fr
om
 fo
re
ig
n 
un
iv
er
si
tie
s.
2 
R
od
ríg
ue
z
B
an
da
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s a
ls
o 
ge
ne
ra
l m
an
ag
er
.  
V
ic
e-
pr
es
id
en
t i
s a
ls
o 
m
an
ag
er
.
1 
N
on
 R
od
ríg
ue
z
B
an
da
Ex
-g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 fr
om
 1
99
6 
to
 2
00
0.
  H
e 
st
ud
ie
d 
m
et
al
 e
ng
in
ee
rin
g
an
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 m
an
ag
em
en
t i
n 
U
.S
. u
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
, a
nd
 w
or
ke
d 
fo
r f
or
ei
gn
 a
nd
st
at
e 
m
in
in
g 
co
m
pa
ni
es
.  
H
e 
al
so
 w
or
ke
d 
fo
r a
 p
riv
at
iz
ed
 c
em
en
t
co
m
pa
ny
.
3 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
M
an
ag
er
 in
 c
ha
rg
e 
of
 fo
od
 b
us
in
es
s h
as
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 E
SA
N
 a
nd
 w
as
ge
ne
ra
l m
an
ag
er
 in
 o
th
er
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 in
 P
er
u.
Fe
rr
ey
ro
s
2 
Fe
rr
ey
ro
s
Fa
m
ily
 m
em
be
rs
 a
re
 p
re
si
de
nt
 a
nd
 d
ire
ct
or
.
no
 F
er
re
yr
os
5 
N
on
 F
er
re
yr
os
10
 sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
G
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 h
as
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
in
 st
at
e 
ba
nk
, d
ev
el
op
m
en
t f
in
an
ce
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
an
d 
W
or
ld
 B
an
k.
  6
 d
ire
ct
or
s h
av
e 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
fo
r m
or
e 
th
an
 2
0 
ye
ar
s. 
 T
w
o 
of
 th
em
 to
ok
 m
an
ag
em
en
t c
ou
rs
e 
at
 E
SA
N
.
C
ill
ón
iz
2 
C
ill
ón
iz
O
ne
 fa
m
ily
 m
em
be
r w
ith
 M
B
A
 is
 m
an
ag
in
g 
di
re
ct
or
, t
he
 o
th
er
 w
ith
m
as
te
r's
 d
eg
re
e 
in
 fi
na
nc
e 
is
 d
ire
ct
or
.
1 
C
ill
ón
iz
O
ne
 w
ith
 M
B
A
 is
 m
an
ag
in
g 
di
re
ct
or
.
11
 N
on
 C
ill
ón
iz
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 fr
om
 m
in
or
ity
 sh
ar
eh
ol
di
ng
 fa
m
ili
es
.  
Tw
o 
of
 th
em
 h
av
e
be
en
 d
ire
ct
or
 si
nc
e 
th
e 
19
60
s a
nd
 th
e 
re
st
 si
nc
e 
th
e 
19
80
s.
5 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
M
an
ag
er
s h
av
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
in
 e
x-
st
at
e 
iro
n 
co
m
pa
ny
, b
ee
r c
om
pa
ny
 a
nd
te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
co
m
pa
ny
.
B
en
tín
B
ue
na
ve
nt
ur
a
 (M
in
in
g)
G
lo
ria
(D
ai
ry
)
Ex
sa
(C
he
m
ic
al
)
B
ac
ku
s &
Jo
hn
st
on
3)
(B
ee
r)
Fe
rr
ey
ro
s
(I
m
po
rt 
of
 c
ap
ita
l
go
od
s)
A
ce
ro
s A
re
qu
ip
a
(S
te
el
)
23
O
w
ne
r f
am
ily
C
om
pa
ny
(I
nd
us
try
)
D
ire
ct
or
s1
)
M
an
ag
er
s
R
af
fo
4 
R
af
fo
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s t
hi
rd
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
tw
o 
di
re
ct
or
s a
re
 fo
ur
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n.
  O
ne
of
 th
e 
fo
ur
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
ha
s m
as
te
r's
 d
eg
re
e 
in
 fi
na
nc
e.
  A
no
th
er
 g
ra
du
at
ed
fr
om
 a
 fo
re
ig
n 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 a
nd
 h
as
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 U
 P
iu
ra
.
1R
af
fo
Fo
ur
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
w
ith
 fo
re
ig
n 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
M
B
A
 fr
om
Pe
ru
vi
an
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 is
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
.
2 
N
on
 R
af
fo
O
ne
 is
 c
ol
la
bo
ra
to
r o
f R
om
er
o 
fa
m
ily
 a
nd
 th
e 
ot
he
r i
s f
or
m
er
 g
en
er
al
m
an
ag
er
 a
t a
n 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
2 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
O
ne
 w
ith
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 U
P 
is
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
an
d 
fin
an
ce
 m
an
ag
er
, a
nd
 le
ga
l
m
an
ag
er
 is
 a
 la
w
ye
r f
ro
m
 P
U
C
P.
4 
R
af
fo
Pr
es
id
en
t i
s t
hi
rd
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
re
e 
di
re
ct
or
s f
ro
m
 fo
ur
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n.
2 
R
af
fo
O
ne
 w
ith
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 fo
ur
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
is
 d
ire
ct
or
 a
nd
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
,
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r w
ith
 fo
re
ig
n 
M
B
A
 is
 a
ss
is
ta
nt
 g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
.  
B
ot
h 
ha
ve
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
in
 g
ro
up
 c
om
pa
ni
es
.
1 
N
on
 R
af
fo
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
fr
om
 m
in
or
ity
 sh
ar
eh
ol
di
ng
 M
ex
ic
an
 c
om
pa
ny
.
3 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
O
ne
 h
as
 M
B
A
 fr
om
 U
P,
 th
e 
ot
he
r h
as
 d
ip
lo
m
a 
fr
om
 E
SA
N
.  
A
no
th
er
 is
C
an
ad
ia
n 
w
ho
 h
as
 st
ud
ie
d 
ho
te
l m
an
ag
em
en
t a
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f N
ev
ad
a 
an
d
ha
s 2
5y
ea
rs
 o
f e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
in
 h
ot
el
 in
du
st
ry
.
4 
R
af
fo
Pr
es
id
en
t a
nd
 th
re
e 
di
re
ct
or
s. 
 In
 2
00
3,
 p
re
si
de
nc
y 
ha
s t
ra
ns
fe
rr
ed
 fr
om
th
ird
 to
 fo
ur
th
 g
en
er
at
io
n.
no
 R
af
fo
In
 2
00
3,
 p
re
si
de
nt
/g
en
er
al
 m
an
ag
er
 o
f t
hi
rd
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
re
si
gn
ed
.
1 
N
on
 R
af
fo
La
w
ye
r
4 
sa
la
rie
d
m
an
ag
er
s
Ea
ch
 h
as
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
in
 P
ro
ct
er
 &
 G
am
bl
e 
an
d 
A
rth
ur
 A
nd
er
se
n.
N
ot
e:
2)
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t C
re
di
co
rp
 w
as
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
fr
om
 F
or
m
 2
0-
F 
at
 S
ec
ur
iti
es
 a
nd
 E
xc
ha
ng
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
.
3）
 T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
as
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
by
 a
 C
ol
om
bi
an
 c
om
pa
ny
 in
 2
00
2.
  I
t w
as
 in
cl
ud
ed
 to
 sh
ow
 c
ha
ng
es
 o
f d
ire
ct
or
s a
nd
 m
an
ag
er
s b
y 
th
e 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
.
So
ur
ce
: E
la
bo
ra
te
d 
b y
 th
e 
au
th
or
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 a
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 o
f r
es
pe
ct
iv
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
.
Te
xt
il 
Sa
n
C
ris
tó
ba
l
(T
ex
til
e)
1)
 D
ire
ct
or
s i
nc
lu
de
 su
bs
tit
ut
e 
an
d 
al
te
rn
at
e 
di
re
ct
or
s.
IE
SA
: I
ns
tit
ut
o 
de
 E
st
ud
io
s S
up
er
io
re
s d
e 
A
dm
in
is
tra
ci
ón
 (V
en
ez
ue
la
); 
IT
ES
M
: I
ns
tit
ut
o 
Te
cn
ol
óg
ic
o 
de
 E
st
ud
io
s S
up
er
io
re
s d
e 
M
on
te
rr
ey
 (M
ex
ic
o)
; E
SA
N
: E
sc
ue
la
 d
e 
A
dm
in
is
tra
ci
ón
 d
e 
N
eg
oc
io
s p
ar
a 
G
ra
du
ad
os
 (P
er
u)
; U
P:
U
ni
ve
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